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Abstract
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have proposed a theory of equilibrium selection that selects
a unique Nash equilibrium for any non-cooperative N-person game. The heart of their
theory is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematical construction that adjusts arbi-
trary prior beliefs into equilibrium beliefs. The tracing procedure plays an important role
in the definition of risk-dominance for Nash equilibria. Although the term “procedure”
suggests a numerical approach, the tracing procedure itself is a non-constructive method.
In this paper we propose a homotopy algorithm that generates a path of strategies. By
employing lexicographic pivoting techniques it can be shown that for the entire class of
non-cooperative N-person games the path converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium,
even when the starting point or the game is degenerate. The outcome of the algorithm is
shown to be arbitrarily close to the beliefs proposed by the tracing procedure. Therefore,
the algorithm does not compute just any Nash equilibrium, but one with a sound game-
theoretic underpinning. Like other homotopy algorithms, it is easily implemented on a
computer. To show our results we apply methods from the theory of simplicial algorithms
and algebraic geometry.
JEL classification: C63, C72
Keywords: Computation of equilibria; Non-cooperative game theory; Tracing procedure
1 Introduction
During the past years, economics has greatly benefitted from the introduction of game
theoric tools. A further use of game theory is, however, hampered by at least two factors.
First of all, there may be many solutions to a game. This view is expressed as follows in
van Damme (1995): “In the last two decades, game theoretic methods have become more
and more important in economics and the other social sciences. Many scientific papers in
these areas have the following basic structure: A problem is modeled as a game, the game
is analyzed by computing its equilibria, and the properties of the latter are translated back
into insights relevant to the original problem. ... It has been found that the tools may not
be powerful enough... For example, many models admit a vast multiplicity of equilibrium
outcomes so that the predictive power of game theoretic analysis is limited. To increase
understanding, it may, hence, be necessary to perfect the tools.” A way out of this dilemma
has been suggested by the equilibrium selection theory as described in Harsanyi and Selten
(1988). The main ingredient of this equilibrium selection theory is constituted by the
linear tracing procedure. The linear tracing procedure plays also an important role in
making risk-dominance comparisons of Nash equilibria, see Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
The concept of risk-dominance is frequently used in evolutionary game theory.
A second problem is that it is usually far from obvious to derive any solution for a
given game. Moreover, considering the quotation of van Damme (1995), to find just a
solution is not good enough. What is really needed is a solution that has a good game
theoretic underpinning, for instance the solution provided by the linear tracing procedure.
In evolutionary game theory attention is often focussed on 2-player games where each
player has two strategies. An important reason to restrict oneself to these games is that
it is very hard to determine the risk-dominance relationships for Nash equilibria in more
complicated games. To do this one needs to apply the linear tracing procedure several
times to these games, which is in general not possible without a numerical algorithm.
This paper presents an algorithm that computates the Nash equilibrium selected by
the linear tracing procedure for N-person non-cooperative games in normal form. The
linear tracing procedure operates as follows. The players start with identical initial beliefs
concerning the play of the other players, so the beliefs concerning the play of a certain
player are equal among all players. First, the players optimize by playing best replies
against these initial beliefs. Next, they observe that their beliefs are not met and they
subsequently update their beliefs and react optimally there upon. This updating of beliefs
continues until equilibrium beliefs for the game have been found.
Mathematically, the linear tracing procedure can be modeled as tracing a path of zeroes
related to a homotopy. The homotopy transforms the initial problem of playing against
the prior beliefs into the equilibrium problem of the game. It has been shown by Harsanyi
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(1975) that for a generic game the linear tracing procedure yields a path of points and
selects a unique outcome. In this case the linear tracing procedure is said to be well
defined. For any game the linear tracing procedure yields a set of stategies that connects
a best reply to the prior beliefs to at least one Nash equilibrium of the game. If one wants
to select a unique Nash equilibrium even in the exceptional case where multiple Nash
equilibria are connected to the prior beliefs, one possibility is to resort to the logarithmic
tracing procedure. Whenever the linear tracing procedure is well defined, the logarithmic
tracing procedure will select the same outcome, see Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991).
The case with N = 2 players corresponds to the class of bimatrix games. The first
algorithm to solve for a Nash equilibrium of these games has been given by Lemke and
Howson (1964). A drawback of this method is that it has to be started at a vertex of
the strategy space. More flexible is the method proposed by van den Elzen and Talman
(1991). This method can be started from any strategy vector in the strategy space. In
van den Elzen and Talman (1995) it is shown that their algorithm generates a non-linear
transformation of the path of beliefs corresponding to the path as generated by the linear
tracing procedure. This non-linear transformation guarantees that the path generated by
the van den Elzen and Talman (1995) algorithm is piecewise linear for bimatrix games, and
is therefore easily implemented on a computer. This linear approach can also be extended
to polymatrix games, see van den Elzen (1996), but not beyond.
The general case with N > 2 is considerably more difficult. For this case the Nash equi-
librium equations are non-linear and in general impossible to solve analytically. Therefore
one has to use a numerical approach. The first procedures for finding an equilibrium for
N-person games are developed by Rosenmüller (1971) and Wilson (1971). Both methods
can be seen as different generalizations of the procedure of Lemke and Howson for 2-player
games. Although these methods are not directly suitable for computational purposes be-
cause they merely prove the existence of a non-linear path leading to an equilibrium, their
seminal work was a very important step towards an implementable algorithm as developed
by Garcia, Lemke and Lüthi (1973). A more efficient algorithm was developed in van der
Laan and Talman (1982) that operates directly on the strategy space and that can be
restarted at any point in the strategy space. The problem with these algorithms is that
they just calculate an approximation of a sample Nash equilibrium and do not bother with
respect to the game-theoretic properties of the equilibrium found.
In this paper we present a method that follows the set of strategies implicitly defined
by the linear tracing procedure arbitrarily close. In this way we make the linear tracing
procedure operational for N-player games. The entire path of strategy vectors generated
possesses a game-theoretic interpretation, see Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Unlike the
algorithm for the 2-player case of van den Elzen and Talman (1995), our algorithm works
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directly on the same strategy space and with the same payoff function as used in the linear
tracing procedure. The entire space is given by [0, 1]×S, with [0, 1] the interval from which
the homotopy parameter, t, is chosen and with S the Cartesian product of the N individual
strategy sets. By triangulating the set [0, 1] × S we will replace the original problem by
a piecewise linear one. The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy algorithms, which
were first developed in Eaves (1972). The algorithm is constructed in such a way that any
triangulation can be used. Of course, in practice one would like to take a triangulation
that can be implemented easily on a computer.
A novelty of the algorithm is that the starting point is endogenously determined by
the payoffs of the game. We show that the algorithm selects in every game a unique
vertex of the strategy space that is related to Nash equilibrium play against the prior (this
latter property may be satisfied for many vertices). The starting point is chosen such that
the algorithm will not generate any other simplices in {0} × S. We prove that we can
approximate the entire path of a well defined linear tracing procedure arbitrarily close by
taking simplices with mesh size small enough. If the linear tracing procedure is not well
defined we will still stay arbitrarily close to the set of strategies generated by it, and we
will compute an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in this set. These features are new
as well, since unlike other simplicial algorithms we have to consider the convergence of a
sequence of paths and not only the convergence of a sequence of end points. Otherwise
we cannot guarantee that the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure is
also selected by the algorithm. For the 2-player case these problems do not occur, since
in that case it is possible to generate the path of the linear tracing procedure exactly. In
order to handle degeneracies we employ lexicographic pivoting techniques. Degeneracies
are important in game theory and are often the rule rather than the exception.
The paper has been organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some notation and the
definition of the linear tracing procedure. Next, in Section 3 we treat some preliminaries for
piecewise linear methods, and in Section 4 we explain the algorithm, which is illustrated in
Section 5 by means of an example. In Section 6 we prove the convergence of the algorithm
for any game. This implies that for every game we can compute an approximate Nash
equilibrium. In Section 7 we show that if the mesh size of the triangulation used goes to
zero, then the paths generated by the algorithm converge to the path of the linear tracing
procedure and the approximate Nash equilibria converge to the Nash equilibrium selected
by the linear tracing procedure.
3
2 The Linear Tracing Procedure
For m ∈ IN, let IRm+ be the non-negative orthant of the m-dimensional Euclidean space and
let Sm denote the (m−1)-dimensional unit simplex in IRm, i.e. Sm = {x ∈ IRm+ |
∑m
j=1 xj =
1}. For j = 1, . . . ,m, we denote by em(j) the j-th m-dimensional unit vector. Furthermore,
0m and 1m denote the m-dimensional vectors of all zeroes and all ones, respectively. The
m-dimensional unit matrix is denoted by Im. The notation co is used to denote the convex
hull of a set.
AnN-person non-cooperative game in normal form is a tuple Γ = (Φ1, . . . ,ΦN , R1, . . . , RN),
with Φi and Ri :
∏
i∈N Φi → IR the set of pure strategies and the payoff function of player
i, and N = {1, . . . , N} the set of players. Player i has Mi pure strategies. The total
number of pure strategies is given by M =
∑
i∈NMi. We number the pure strategies of
player i. For k = 1, . . . ,Mi, pure strategy k of player i is denoted by (i, k). The union of
the pure strategies over all players is denoted by Φ∗ = ∪i∈NΦi. The set of pure strategy
combinations is given by Φ =
∏
i∈N Φi.
A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution on Φi. Since the strategies are
numbered, we can identify the set of all probability distributions on Φi with S
Mi, where
for si ∈ SMi the probability assigned to pure strategy (i, k) is given by sik. The strategy
space of the game is therefore equal to S =
∏
i∈N S
Mi. Observe that the dimension of S
equals M − N . Given a mixed strategy combination s ∈ S and a strategy si ∈ SMi, we
denote by s \ si the mixed strategy combination that results from replacing si by si. If a
mixed strategy combination s is played, then the probability s(φ) that the pure strategy










A mixed strategy combination s is said to be a Nash equilibrium of a game Γ if it is a best
reply against itself. The set of Nash equilibria of a game Γ is denoted by NE(Γ).
For the remainder of the paper an N-person non-cooperative game Γ is assumed to be
given. In the description of the linear tracing procedure a subjective probability distri-
bution p ∈ S, called prior, is given. The prior describes the initial beliefs of all players
about the strategies played by the other players. So, it is assumed that all players have the
same initial beliefs. The determination of the prior is one of the aspects of the equilibrium
selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). For the remainder of the paper a prior p
is assumed to be given.
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For every t ∈ [0, 1], the linear tracing procedure generates a Nash equilibrium of a game
Γt = (Φ1, . . . ,ΦN , Ht1, . . . , H
t
N ), where the payoff function H
t
i : S → IR of player i is defined
by
Hti (s) = tRi(s) + (1− t)Ri(p \ si).
Together all the Nash equilibria generated by the linear tracing procedure yield a set of
strategies (usually a path of strategies) linking a Nash equilibrium of Γ0 to a Nash equi-
librium of Γ1. In a Nash equilibrium st of the game Γt every player i plays a best reply in
the game Γ against the probability distribution t[s] + (1− t)[p] on Φ, with [s] and [p] the
probability distributions on Φ generated by s and p, respectively. The probability distribu-
tion t[s] + (1− t)[p] does in general not belong to S, since this probability distribution may
be correlated. The interpretation of the linear tracing procedure is that players gradually
adjust their beliefs about the behaviour of the other players, giving less and less weight to
the initial beliefs, the prior. In the game Γ0 for instance there is no strategic interaction
and players simply choose a best reply to the prior. In the game Γ1 there is no longer a
role for the prior and players choose a best reply against the choices of their opponents.
For more details on the tracing procedure the reader is referred to Harsanyi and Selten
(1988).
The marginal payoff function G : [0, 1]× S → IRM is defined by
Gik(t, s) = tRi(s \ (i, k)) + (1− t)Ri(p \ (i, k)), (i, k) ∈ Φ∗. (1)
Gik(t, s) is the payoff to player i when playing pure strategy (i, k) against the mixed
strategy combination s in game Γt or, alternatively, the payoff to player i when playing
pure strategy (i, k) against the probability distribution t[s] + (1− t)[p] on Φ in the game Γ.
It is standard to derive the payoff functions Ht1, . . . , H
t
N from the marginal payoff functions
G(t, ·) and to characterize a Nash equilibrium of the game Γt in terms of G(t, ·). Indeed,
s is a Nash equilibrium of Γt if and only if sik > 0 implies Gik(t, s) = max(i,l)∈Φi Gil(t, s).
Hence it makes sense to define for ε ≥ 0 an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γt as follows.
Definition 2.1 Let (Γ, p) be given. For ε ≥ 0, a mixed strategy combination s ∈ S is
called an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γt if sik > 0 implies Gik(t, s) ≥ max(i,l)∈ΦiGil(t, s)− ε.
A player can increase his payoff in an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γt at most by ε by choosing
a best reply.
The set of all Nash equilibria related to the games Γt, t ∈ [0, 1], is denoted by
L = {(t, s) ∈ [0, 1]× S | s ∈ NE(Γt)}.
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in L connecting
a best reply against the prior to a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ, i.e. there exists a
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continuous function γ : [0, 1]→ L such that γ(0) ∈ L∩ ({0}×S) and γ(1) ∈ L∩ ({1}×S).
It is shown in Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991) that the linear tracing procedure is always
feasible. However, there may be many trajectories γ([0, 1]) that link a Nash equilibrium of
Γ0 to a Nash equilibrium of Γ1. If this trajectory is unique, then the linear tracing procedure
is said to be well defined. If the linear tracing procedure is well defined, then it selects a
unique Nash equilibrium of the game Γ. It is shown by Harsanyi (1975) that, given a prior,
the linear tracing procedure is well defined for almost all N-person non-cooperative games.
It is obvious that the set L0 = L ∩ ({0} × S) is connected. In fact, because of the
linearity of G(0, ·) it holds that L0 is a polytope, the set of best replies against p. We
denote the component, i.e. a maximally connected subset, of L that contains L0 by Lc.
Since L is a semi-algebraic set, see Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991), it holds that Lc is
path-connected. The linear tracing procedure is feasible if and only if Lc ∩ ({1} × S) 6= ∅.
An implication of well definedness of the linear tracing procedure is that both Lc∩({0}×S)
and Lc ∩ ({1} × S) consist of a single element.
If the number of players is equal to 2, then it is possible to compute the set Lc exactly.
However, even in that case there is a need for a systematic approach as given in van den
Elzen and Talman (1995). If the number of players is greater than or equal to 3, then
computing the set Lc corresponds to solving a higher order polynomial, which cannot be
done in general. In that case there is not only a need for a systematic approach, but also
for a numerical algorithm.
3 A Piecewise Linear Approach
The basic idea for the algorithm is relatively simple. We approximate the marginal payoff
function G as given in (1) by a function that is piecewise linear on [0, 1]× S. Then we can
solve for the set Lc corresponding to this piecewise linear approximation.
Let us discuss some preliminaries related to piecewise linear approximations. For given
m ∈ IN, an m-dimensional simplex or m-simplex σ in IRn is defined as the convex hull of
m+1 affinely independent points x1, . . . , xm+1 of IRn. We usually write σ = σ(x1, . . . , xm+1)
and call x1, . . . , xm+1 the vertices of σ. An (m − 1)-simplex being the convex hull of m
vertices of σ(x1, . . . , xm+1) is said to be a facet of σ.The facet τ (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xm+1)
is called the facet of σ opposite to the vertex xj. For a non-negative integer m′ less than
or equal to m, an m′-simplex being the convex hull of m′+ 1 vertices of σ is said to be an
m′-face or face of σ.
A finite collection Σ of m-simplices is a triangulation of an m-dimensional convex subset
T of IRn if
1. T is the union of all simplices in Σ;
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2. the intersection of any two simplices in Σ is either empty or a common face of both.
If Σ is a triangulation of T, and a facet τ of σ1 ∈ Σ is a subset of the relative boundary
of T, then there is no σ2 ∈ Σ such that σ2 6= σ1 and τ is a facet of σ2. If τ is not a subset
of the relative boundary of T, then there is exactly one σ2 ∈ Σ such that σ2 6= σ1 and
τ is also a facet of σ2. The mesh size of a triangulation Σ of T is defined by mesh(Σ) =
max{‖x− y‖∞ | x, y ∈ σ, σ ∈ Σ}.
It is well-known that full-dimensional affine parts of the relative boundary of a set are
triangulated by the facets of the simplices in a triangulation. More precisely, let Σ be a
triangulation of a convex m-dimensional subset T of IRn, and let the (m− 1)-dimensional
subset T of the relative boundary of T be such that T is equal to the affine hull of T
intersected with T. Then the collection Σ given by Σ = {τ ∈ T | ∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a facet of
σ} is a triangulation of T, see Todd (1976a), Theorem 2.3, page 27. For instance, the set
{0} × S is triangulated by the facets of the simplices in a triangulation of [0, 1]× S.
An example of a triangulation of [0, 1] × S has been introduced in Doup and Talman
(1987) and uses earlier ideas of Eaves and Saigal (1972), Todd (1976b) and van der Laan and
Talman (1980). It is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case we have two players each having
two pure strategies. Although any triangulation of [0, 1] × S will do for the purposes
of the algorithm, this triangulation has several nice properties. First of all, it is easily
implemented on a computer. Moreover, it has several nice symmetry properties. For
example, it enables us to choose points t0, . . . , tk with t0 = 0 and tk = 1 (and a natural
choice would be tj = j/k, j = 0, . . . , k) such that every slice {tj} × S is triangulated
in an identical way by the facets of the simplices in the triangulation. Any simplex in








] × S is filled up with
simplices in a consistent way. All 3-simplices in co(x3, x5, x6, x12, x14, x15) are depicted in
Figure 1. The mesh size of this triangulation can be made arbitrarily small.
For later purposes we give all 3-simplices in the triangulation of Figure 1 in Table 2. In
Table 2 only the 3-simplices in [0, 1
2
]× S are given. The ones in [ 1
2
, 1]× S follow by means
of a translation. The position in the table is related to the position of a simplex in the
triangulation.
A functionG : [0, 1]×S → IRM is called a piecewise linear approximation of the marginal
payoff function G with respect to Σ if for each vertex xj of any σ(x1, . . . , xM−N+2) ∈ Σ,




j, λj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,M − N + 2,
∑M−N+2
j=1 λj = 1, then G(x) =∑M−N+2
j=1 λjG(x
j).
Definition 3.1 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. A mixed strategy combination s ∈ S is called an















Figure 1. A triangulation of [0, 1]× S. The vertex x1 = (0, (1, 0), (1, 0)) refers to the
strategy vector at which both players play their first pure strategy. Similarly, x3, x7, and
x9 correspond to (0, (0, 1), (1, 0)), (0, (1, 0), (0, 1)), and (0, (0, 1), (0, 1)), respectively.
The algorithm will yield a path of approximate Nash equilibria going from an approximate
Nash equilibrium of Γ0 to an approximate Nash equilibrium of Γ1. An approximate Nash
equilibrium of Γt is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium of Γt (although it is possible to show
that an approximate Nash equilibrium of Γ0 is a Nash equilibrium of Γ0). Nevertheless,
the following result shows that it is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γt with ε > 0 related to the
mesh size of the triangulation.
Theorem 3.2 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. For every ε > 0 we can choose δ > 0 such that
x̂, x̃ ∈ [0, 1]×S, ‖x̂− x̃‖∞ ≤ δ, implies ‖G(x̂)−G(x̃)‖∞ ≤ 12ε. If the mesh size of Σ is less
co({x4, x7, x5, x14}) co({x8, x7, x5, x14}) co({x8, x9, x5, x14}) co({x6, x9, x5, x14})
co({x4, x7, x16, x14}) co({x8, x7, x16, x14}) co({x8, x9, x18, x14}) co({x6, x9, x18, x14})
co({x4, x13, x16, x14}) co({x8, x17, x16, x14}) co({x8, x17, x18, x14}) co({x6, x15, x18, x14})
co({x4, x1, x5, x14}) co({x2, x1, x5, x14}) co({x2, x3, x5, x14}) co({x6, x3, x5, x14})
co({x4, x1, x10, x14}) co({x2, x1, x10, x14}) co({x2, x3, x12, x14}) co({x6, x3, x12, x14})
co({x4, x13, x10, x14}) co({x2, x11, x10, x14}) co({x2, x11, x12, x14}) co({x6, x15, x12, x14})




than δ and s is an approximate Nash equilibrium of Γt, then s is an ε-Nash equilibrium of
Γt.
Proof
Let ε > 0 be given. Since G is a continuous function with domain a compact set, we can
choose δ > 0 as in the theorem. Let the mesh size of Σ be less than δ and let s be an
approximate Nash equilibrium of Γt. Let σ ∈ Σ be such that x = (t, s) ∈ σ. Then there
exists λ ∈ IRM−N+2 such that
∑M−N+2
j=1 λj = 1 and x =
∑M−N+2
j=1 λjx


















Now, sik > 0 implies














By Theorem 3.2 we will be able to show that the algorithm generates a path of ε-Nash
equilibria of games Γt, t ∈ [0, 1], with ε going to zero if the mesh size δ of the triangulation
Σ goes to zero. The result makes clear that it is possible to give an upper bound for δ in
terms of ε, the payoffs of the game, Ri, and the prior, p.
4 The Algorithm
Let a subset B∗ of Φ∗ be given with the property that for every player i there is at least one
pure strategy (i, k) in B∗. Such a set B∗ is called admissible. Let Bi denote the set of all
pure strategies of player i in B∗. The set Bi is related to all best replies of player i against
a certain strategy combination. The set S(B∗) denotes all mixed strategy combinations






sik = 1, i ∈ N
}
.
Let a triangulation Σ of [0, 1]×S be given. For an admissible subset B∗ of Φ∗ we denote
by Σ(B∗) the collection of m-faces of simplices in Σ, where m = |B∗| + 1 − N, that are
contained in [0, 1]× S(B∗), so
Σ(B∗) = {τ ⊂ [0, 1]× S(B∗) | ∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a (|B∗|+ 1−N)-face of σ}.
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Here |B∗| denotes the cardinality of B∗. By repeated application of the result that claims
that the relative boundary of a set is triangulated by the facets of a triangulation, it follows
that Σ(B∗) is a triangulation of [0, 1]× S(B∗). Notice that Σ(Φ∗) = Σ.
Let an admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗ and a simplex σ(x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈ Σ(B∗) be given. Consider
solutions ξ = ((λj)j=1,...,m+1, (µik)(i,k)∈Φ∗\B∗, (βi)i∈N ) ∈ IR
M+2 of the following system of
equations: ∑m+1





Mi(k)− βi1Mi = 0Mi, i ∈ N .
(2)
If λj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m + 1, and µik ≥ 0, (i, k) ∈ Φi \ Bi, then ξ is called an admissible
solution to (2). An admissible solution ξ corresponds to an approximate Nash equilibrium
s of Γt. Indeed, (t, s) =
∑m+1
j=1 λjx
j, strategies in B∗ are best replies given the marginal
payoff function G, µik is the payoff gap between strategy (i, k) ∈ Φi \ Bi and a best reply
for player i, and βi is the expected payoff for player i. Since σ ⊂ [0, 1]× S(B∗), strategies
that are not a best reply are played with probability zero. An admissible solution to (2)
is said to be degenerate if at least two of the variables λj , j = 1, . . . ,m + 1, and µik,
(i, k) ∈ Φ∗ \B∗, are equal to zero.
In the remainder of this section an algorithm will be introduced that generates by
means of lexicographic pivoting techniques a piecewise linear path of approximate Nash
equilibria in [0, 1] × S joining {0} × S to {1} × S. The path is such that every (t, s)
on it corresponds to an admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗, a simplex σ ∈ Σ(B∗), and an admissible
solution ξ as described above. The algorithm will specify in a unique way how to move
from one simplex to another. For given (B∗, σ), (2) corresponds to a linear system with
M + 1 equations and M + 2 variables. If we rule out degeneracies, then a non-empty
solution set is a 1-dimensional compact line segment. The end points of the line segment
are either approximate Nash equilibria for Γ0 or Γ1, or yield solutions for a new (B∗, σ).
Indeed, degeneracies ruled out, at an end-point either λj = 0 for exactly one j, or µik = 0
for exactly one (i, k) ∈ Φi \Bi. In the first case, the end-point belongs to the facet τ of σ
opposite to the vertex xj. If τ belongs to the relative interior of [0, 1]×S(B∗), then there is a
unique simplex σ ∈ Σ(B∗) such that σ 6= σ, and τ is a facet of σ. The algorithm continues
by generating a line-segment of solutions in σ. If τ belongs to the relative boundary of
[0, 1]× S(B∗), then the end-point is either an approximate Nash equilibrium for Γ0, or an
approximate Nash equilibrium for Γ1, or τ ∈ Σ(B∗), with B∗ a uniquely determined subset
of B∗ having one element less, and the algorithm continues with a line-segment of solutions
in τ. If µik = 0, then also strategy (i, k) is a best reply. The algorithm continues with a
line-segment of solutions in σ, where σ is the unique simplex in Σ(B∗ ∪ {(i, k)}) having σ
as a facet.
In game theory degeneracy is not always a non-generic phenomenon. For instance, for a
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normal form representation of a game in extensive form, degeneracy is the rule rather than
the exception, even if the payoffs in the extensive form game are randomly chosen. But
also in other normal form games, representing certain economic situations, degeneracy can
easily occur, simply because payoffs are not randomly chosen but reflect some structure that
is present in the economic model. We will deal with degeneracy by exploiting lexicographic
pivoting techniques. In this paper we extend the techniques as used in Eaves (1971), Todd
(1976a), Wright (1981), and Herings, Talman, and Yang (1996).
Let us take a closer look at the system (2). For an admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗ and a facet
τ (x1, . . . , xm) of a simplex in Σ(B∗), the (M + 1)× (M + 1)-matrix AB∗,τ is defined by
AB∗,τ =

1 · · · 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
E1 0 −1M1 0
G(x1) · · · G(xm) 0
. . . 0 0
. . . 0
0 0 EN 0 0 −1MN
 ,
where, for i ∈ N , Ei = [eMi(k)](i,k)∈Φi\Bi. The matrix AB∗,τ corresponds to the coefficients
in (2) when a facet τ of a simplex σ is considered. Suppose A−1B∗,τ exists. From AB∗,τA
−1
B∗,τ =
IM+1 it follows that the first column of A−1B∗,τ corresponds to an admissible solution to (2)
for any σ ∈ Σ(B∗) being the convex hull of τ and some vertex xm+1 ∈ [0, 1] × S(B∗),
whenever the first M + 1−N components of this column are non-negative. No restrictions
are imposed on the last N rows of A−1B∗,τ . In a non-degenerate solution the first M + 1−N
components are all positive, since λm+1 = 0 extends the solution for the facet τ to the
simplex σ.
A row vector x ∈ IRM+1 is lexicographically positive if x 6= 0M+1
>
and its first non-zero
entry is positive. The matrix AB∗,τ is said to be semi-lexicopositive if each of the first
M + 1−N rows is lexicographically positive.
Definition 4.1 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given and let B∗ be an admissible subset of Φ∗. A facet τ
of a simplex in Σ(B∗) is B∗-complete if A
−1
B∗,τ exists and is semi-lexicopositive.
By restricting attention to complete facets, we will be able to take care of degeneracy
problems. Given a linear system of equations as in (2), determined by a B∗-complete facet
τ, we will pivot in a new column, either of the type (1, G(xm+1)) or of the type (0, eM(k)).
By making semi-lexicographic pivot steps, this determines in a unique way a column out
of the first M + 1−N to be replaced. A semi-lexicographic pivot step replaces the unique
column out of the first M+1−N ones, that makes the inverse of the resulting matrix AB∗,τ
semi-lexicopositive. Such a pivot step is not more difficult to carry out than a normal one
and coincides with it if there is no degeneracy.
The consideration ofB∗-complete facets will also provide us with a unique, endogenously
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determined, starting point for the algorithm. The admissible subset B0∗ of Φ∗ is defined
by B0i = {(i, ki)}, i ∈ N , where ki is the largest integer such that (i, ki) is a best reply to





see Lemma 6.1 for a proof. It will be shown that there is no other B∗-complete facet τ
in {0} × S. Even in degenerate cases, the semi-lexicographic rules single out the unique
B0∗-complete facet {0} × S(B
0
∗), which will serve as a unique, endogenously determined
starting point of the algorithm.
The steps of the algorithm are as follows.
Algorithm 4.2 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given.
Step 0. Let m = 1 and n = 1. Let B∗ = B0∗ , τ
1 = {0} × S(B∗), and let x2 be the unique
vertex of the 1-simplex of Σ(B∗) containing τ 1 as the facet opposite to it.
Step 1. Let σ be equal to the convex hull of τn and {xm+1}. Make a semi-lexicographic
pivot step with (1, G(xm+1)) into the system of equations (2) corresponding to AB∗,τn,
yielding a unique column j′ of AB∗,τn which has to be replaced. If j
′ ∈ {m+1, . . . ,M+
1−N}, then go to Step 3 with (i′, k′) the pure strategy corresponding to column j′.
Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2. Increase the value of n by 1 and let τn be the facet of σ opposite xj
′
. If τn ⊂ {1}×S,
then the algorithm terminates with an approximate Nash equilibrium s∗ of Γ1 induced
by the solution of (2) corresponding to AB∗,τn. If τ
n ∈ Σ(B∗) for some admissible
B∗ ⊂ Φ∗, then go to Step 4. Otherwise, there is exactly one m-simplex σ of Σ(B∗)
such that σ 6= σ and τn is a facet of σ. Go to Step 1 with xm+1 as the unique vertex
of σ opposite τn.
Step 3. Let the admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗ be defined by B∗ = B∗ ∪ {(i′, k′)}. There is a unique
simplex σ of Σ(B∗) having σ as a facet. Increase the value of both m and n by 1 and
go to Step 1 with xm+1 as the unique vertex of σ opposite σ, B∗ = B∗, and τ
n = σ.
Step 4. Let σ be equal to τn. Make a semi-lexicographic pivot step with
(0, eM(
∑i−1
i=1 Mi+k)) into the system of equations (2) corresponding to AB∗,τn, where
(i, k) is such that B∗ ∪ {(i, k)} = B∗. This yields a unique column j′ of AB∗,τn which
has to be replaced. If j′ ∈ {m+1, . . . ,M+1−N}, then decrease the value of both m
and n by 1 and go to Step 3 with (i′, k′) the pure strategy corresponding to column
j′ and B∗ = B∗. Otherwise, decrease the value of m by 1 and go to Step 2 with
B∗ = B∗.
In Section 6 it is shown that every step in the algorithm is feasible and that every semi-
lexicographic pivot step is unique. Furthermore, the algorithm is shown to terminate after
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a finite number of steps, after having generated a B∗-complete facet τ being a subset of
{1} × S(B∗).
Consider all different pairs (B1∗ , τ
1), . . . , (B k̂∗ , τ
k̂) successively generated by Algorith-
m 4.2. For k = 1, . . . , k̂, τ k = τ k(x1, . . . , xm
k
) with mk = |Bk∗ | + 1 − N. Define x̃
k =
(t̃k, s̃k) ∈ τ k by x̃k =
∑mk
j=1 λjx
j with λj following from the admissible solution of sys-
tem (2) corresponding to ABk∗ ,τk. So s̃
k is an approximate Nash equilibrium of Γt̃
k
. For
r ∈ IR, define brc as the greatest integer which is less than or equal to r. Finally, define
the piecewise linear, continuous function π : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]× S by
π(r) = (1− (k̂ − 1)r + b(k̂ − 1)rc)x̃1+b(k̂−1)rc + ((k̂ − 1)r − b(k̂ − 1)rc)x̃2+b(k̂−1)rc.
Consider some r ∈ [0, 1]. Then π(r) = (t, s) is a convex combination of two points x̃k and
x̃k+1. It is easily verified, because of the linearity of the system, that π(r) gives rise to an
admissible solution for (2) with B∗ equal to Bk∗ ∩B
k+1
∗ and σ equal to the convex hull of τ
k
and τ k+1. So, s is an approximate Nash equilibrium of Γt. The function π : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]×S
is called the path generated by the algorithm. When the mesh size of the triangulation
used goes to zero, the path generated by the algorithm converges to the linear tracing
procedure, for a proof and a precise statement see Section 7.
5 An Example
To illustrate Algorithm 4.2, we consider the game of Figure 2. The unique Nash equi-








)). We write Φ1 = {(1, 1), (1, 2)}, Φ2 = {(2, 1), (2, 2)},









)). It follows that







Ht2(s) = tR2(s) + (1− t)[3s21 + 2s22],
and
G11(t, s) = t(2s21 + s22) + (1− t)74 ,




G21(t, s) = t(2s11 + 4s12) + (1− t)3,
G22(t, s) = t(4s11) + (1− t)2.
We take the triangulation Σ depicted in Figure 1.
First we have to determineB0∗ . It is given byB
0
∗ = {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. Against the prior both























. The tie-breaking rule introduced to determine B0∗ , requires that the second pure strategy
of player 1 is selected. It is obvious that s0 = ((0, 1), (1, 0)) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ0.





Figure 2. A 2-person game.
unique simplex of Σ({(1, 2), (2, 1)}) containing τ 1 as a facet is given by σ = co({x3, x12}),
and the unique vertex of it not in τ 1 is x12. This terminates Step 0. It holds that
AB0∗,τ1 =

1 0 0 0 0
7
4
1 0 −1 0
7
4
0 0 −1 0
3 0 0 0 −1





1 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0
1 0 0 −1 1
7
4
0 −1 0 0
3 0 0 −1 0

.
It is easily verified that (AB0∗,τ1)
−1 is semi-lexicopositive. The first column of (AB0∗,τ1)
−1,
given by the vector (1, 0, 1, 7
4
, 3), corresponds to an admissible solution of (2). Here, λ1 = 1,
the weight attached to vertex x3, µ11 = 0, µ22 = 1, the losses in payoff for player 1 using
his first strategy and for player 2 using his second strategy, and β1 =
7
4
, β2 = 3, the
expected payoffs of players 1 and 2. Now we have to make a semi-lexicographic pivot






, 1)) into the system of equations (2) corresponding
to AB0∗,τ1. This yields column 2 to be replaced, which corresponds to pure strategy (1, 1).
Since 2 ∈ {2, 3}, we go to Step 3 and we increase the dimension of the simplices generated
by 1.
Step 3 takes B∗ = B∗ ∪{(1, 1)} = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}. The unique simplex σ of Σ(B∗)
having co({x3, x12}) as a facet is co({x2, x3, x12}). Next, m and n are set equal to 2, and
Step 1 is carried out with x3 = x2, B∗ = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}, and τ 2 = co({x3, x12}), etc.
The algorithm reaches {1}×S after generating the 13 facets that are denoted by τ 1, . . . , τ 13
in Figure 3.
It can be verified that τ 1 = {x3}, τ 2 = co({x3, x12}), τ 3 = co({x2, x12}), τ 4 =
co({x2, x11}), τ 5 = co({x2, x10}), τ 6 = co({x1, x10}), τ 7 = co({x4, x10}), τ 8 =
co({x4, x10, x13}), τ 9 = co({x10, x13, x14}), τ 10 = co({x10, x14, x23}), τ 11 = co({x10, x11, x23}),
τ 12 = co({x11, x19, x23}), and τ 13 = co({x19, x20, x23}). An interesting situation occurs at















Figure 3. The algorithm in action.
boundary of S(B∗), τ 6 ∈ Σ({(1, 1), (2, 1)}). We have to go to Step 4 in order to decrease
the dimension by 1. In Step 4 we pivot in the vector (0, e4(2)) since B∗ = B∗ ∪ {(1, 2)}.
This yields column 3 to be replaced, which corresponds to pure strategy 2 of player 2.
Since 3 ∈ {3}, we go to Step 3 to increase the dimension. It holds that τ 6 is both
{(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}-complete and {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2)}-complete, yielding two different ad-
missible solutions to the system of equations (2).
The importance of the semi-lexicographic pivot steps becomes clear when reaching
τ 10. When x23 is pivoted in, ordinary pivot steps cannot determine whether x13 or x14
should be pivoted out. Let us denote the facet obtained by pivoting out x14 by τ 10, so
τ 10 = co({x10, x13, x23}). In both cases B∗ = Φ∗. It holds that
AΦ∗,τ10 =













































































































It is easily verified that (AΦ∗,τ10)
−1 is not semi-lexicopositive, since the third row is not
lexicographically positive. So τ 10 will not be generated by the semi-lexicographic pivot
steps, but instead τ 10 is the uniquely determined facet. Since τ 13 ⊂ {1}×S, the algorithm
will terminate there as is dictated by Step 2.
The path generated by the algorithm in the example is illustrated in Figure 3 by the

































































































and all convex combinations of two successive points. The end point is exactly equal to
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game Γ.
Because the game of Figure 2 is so simple, it is possible to determine the set L exactly.
This set is depicted in Figure 3 by the dotted line. It is easily seen that L consists of only
















































It is clear from the figure that even though the mesh size of the triangulation is pretty large,
the set L is approximated very well by Algorithm 4.2. The approximate Nash equilibrium








))), is an exact Nash equilibrium.
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6 Convergence to an ε-Nash Equilibrium of Γ
We show that every step in Algorithm 4.2 is unique and feasible, and that the algorithm
generates a piecewise linear path in a sequence of adjacent simplices. The path consists
of approximate Nash equilibria of Γt, t ∈ [0, 1]. First we show that τ = {0} × S(B0∗) is
B0∗-complete and that there is no other 0-simplex in the slice {0} × S that is B∗-complete
for some B∗. We consider the case |B∗| = N first.
Lemma 6.1 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. The facet τ = {0} × S(B0∗) is B
0
∗ -complete. There is
no other B∗-complete facet τ in {0} × S with |B∗| = N.
Proof
Let t = 0 and |B∗| = N. If τ ⊂ {0}×S is B∗-complete, then, for i ∈ N , Bi = {(i, ki)} with
(i, ki) a best reply for player i against the p. It is straightforward that
AB∗,τ =

1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
R1(p \ (1, 1))... E1 0 0 −1M1 0 0
R1(p \ (1,M1))
... 0
. . . 0 0
. . . 0
RN (p \ (N, 1))... 0 0 EN 0 0 −1MN
RN (p \ (N,MN ))

,




1 0 · · · 0
R̃1 Ẽ1 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
R̃N 0 0 ẼN
R1(p \ (1, k1))... −eN×M1(1, k1) · · · −eN×MN (N, kN )
RN (p \ (N, kN ))

,
where R̃i ∈ IR
Mi−1
+ is the column vector given by R̃il = Ri(p \ (i, ki)) − Ri(p \ (i, l)),
(i, l) ∈ Φi \ {(i, ki)}, and where Ẽi is the (Mi − 1) ×Mi-matrix given by
Ẽi =
[
eMi−1(1) · · · eMi−1(ki − 1) −1Mi−1 eMi−1(ki) · · · eMi−1(Mi − 1)
]
and eN×Mi(i, ki) is the (N ×Mi)-matrix filled with zeroes, except in row i column ki where
a 1 occurs. If ki = 1, then the first column of Ẽi is given by −1Mi−1, and if ki = Mi, then
the last column of Ẽi is given by −1Mi−1. By computing AB∗,τA
−1
B∗,τ it is easily verified that
A−1B∗,τ is indeed given by the expression above. Now A
−1
B∗,τ is semi-lexicopositive if and only
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if ki is the largest integer such that (i, ki) is a best reply to p for player i. Q.E.D.
The next lemma shows that there are no B∗-complete facets τ in {0} × S where the
cardinality of B∗ exceeds N.
Lemma 6.2 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. Then there is no B∗-complete facet τ in {0} × S with
|B∗| > N.
Proof




1 · · · 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
E1 0 −1M1 0
G(0, s1) · · · G(0, sm) 0
. . . 0 0
. . . 0
0 0 EN 0 0 −1MN
 .
Observe that Gik(0, sj) = Ri(p \ (i, k)), (i, k) ∈ Φi. So, G(0, sj) is independent of j and
AB∗,τ is not invertible. Therefore, τ is certainly not B∗-complete. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.1 selects for each player a unique pure strategy such that the resulting pure
strategy combination, denoted by s0, is a Nash equilibrium for the game Γ0. Lemma 6.2
shows that there are no other Nash equilibria for the game Γ0 that satisfy our criterion of
completeness. The resulting point (0, s0) is linked in Step 0 of Algorithm 4.2 to a point




The following lemma is well-known in linear programming theory, see for example Murty
(1983). It can be used to link several complete facets to each other. Moreover, it gives us
an easy way to perform a semi-lexicographic pivot step.
Lemma 6.3 Let an invertible n× n matrix A, a vector z of IRn, and some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
be given. The n×n matrix A is defined by A = (A·1 . . . A·j−1 z A·j+1 . . . A·n). Then either
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Lemma 6.3 is easily shown by calculating A−1A. The structure of the remainder of the
convergence proof is closely related to the one of Wright (1981) and Herings, Talman
and Yang (1996), although we have to deal of course with the specifics of our algorithm.
For the proofs of Lemma 6.4 and 6.5 we use the concept of a lexicographic ordering. A
vector x ∈ IRn is said to be lexicographically greater than a vector x ∈ IRn if x − x is
lexicographically positive. In this way the lexicographic ordering is obtained, a complete
ordering on IRn.
Lemma 6.4 describes all possible cases that may occur if a B∗-complete facet τ is given
and a semi-lexicographic pivot step with a vector (1, G(xm+1)) is made, where xm+1 is a
vertex of a simplex having τ as a facet opposite to it.
Lemma 6.4 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ of a simplex σ ∈ Σ(B∗).
Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. σ has exactly one other B∗-complete facet τ ,
2. σ is B∗-complete for precisely one admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗.
Proof





Since (AB∗,τ)1· = (1
m>, 0M+1−m
>









l = 2, . . . ,M+1. Suppose that the first M+1−N components of y are non-positive. Then

















where the first inequality uses that m ≤ M + 1 − N. Consequently, yj > 0 for some
j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1−N}. Let j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1−N} be such that 1
yj′
(A−1B∗,τ )j′· is minimal
according to the lexicographic ordering over all row vectors 1
yj
(A−1B∗,τ)j· for which yj > 0
and j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1 − N}. The row j′ is uniquely determined because otherwise there
would be two rows that are linearly dependent and A−1B∗,τ would not be invertible. It holds
that either j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} or j′ ∈ {m+ 1, . . . ,M + 1−N}.
In the first case let τ be the facet of σ opposite xj
′
. By Lemma 6.3 and the choice of j′
it follows that A−1B∗,τ exists and is semi-lexicopositive. So τ is B∗-complete.
In the second case it holds that column j′ of AB∗,τ corresponds to pure strategy k of
player i. Let B∗ ⊂ Φ∗ be defined by B∗ = B∗ ∪ {(i, k)}. Obviously, B∗ is admissible and σ
is a facet of a simplex of Σ(B∗). By Lemma 6.3 and the choice of j′ it follows that A
−1
B∗,σ
exists and is semi-lexicopositive. So, σ is B∗-complete.
Lemma 6.3 guarantees that replacement of another column of AB∗,τ would give a new
matrix that does not have a semi-lexicopositive inverse. This implies that the two cases
considered above are mutually exclusive, and that the facet τ and the set B∗ are uniquely
determined. Q.E.D.
The operation used in the proof of Lemma 6.4, where a column of AB∗,τ is determined in a
unique way and is replaced by the vector (1, G(xm+1)), is called a semi-lexicographic pivot
step in Step 1 of Algorithm 4.2. Case 1 occurs in the algorithm if one goes from Step 1 to
Step 2, and Case 2 if one goes from Step 1 to Step 3.
Consider a B∗-complete facet τ that is also a simplex belonging to Σ(B∗) for some
admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗. Then there is a unique strategy (i, k) such that B∗ = B∗ ∪ {(i, k)}.
Lemma 6.5 describes all possible cases that may occur if a semi-lexicographic pivot step
with a vector (0, eM(l)) is made, where l =
∑i−1
i=1Mi + k.
Lemma 6.5 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ that belongs to Σ(B∗)
for some admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗. Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. τ is B̂∗-complete for precisely one admissible B̂∗ ⊂ Φ∗ with B̂∗ 6= B∗,
2. precisely one facet υ of τ is B∗-complete.
Proof
There is a unique strategy (i, k) such that B∗ = B∗ ∪ {(i, k)}. Define l =
∑i−1
i=1Mi + k. Let






Since (AB∗,τ)1· = (1
m>, 0M+1−m
>
































(AB∗,τ )l+1,jyj = −yM+1−N+i.
So, yM+1−N+i = −1 and a solution to AB∗,τy =
 0
eM(l)
 can only exist if (i, k) /∈ Bi for
every k 6= k. Since B∗ = B∗ ∪{(i, k)}, it follows that B∗ is not admissible, a contradiction.
Consequently, yj > 0 for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,M+1−N}. Let j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M+1−N} be such
that 1
yj′
(A−1B∗,τ )j′· is minimal according to the lexicographic ordering over all row vectors
1
yj
(A−1B∗,τ)j· for which yj > 0 and j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1 − N}. The row j
′ has to be unique
because otherwise A−1B∗,τ would not be invertible. It holds that either j
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} or
j′ ∈ {m+ 1, . . . ,M + 1−N}.
If j′ ∈ {m + 1, . . . ,M + 1 − N}, then let (i′, k′) be the strategy that corresponds to
column j′. Let an admissible B̂∗ ⊂ Φ∗ be defined by B̂∗ = B∗∪{(i′, k′)}, and consider AB̂∗,τ .
By Lemma 6.3 the choice of j′ guarantees that A−1
B̂∗,τ
is semi-lexicopositive and therefore τ
is B̂∗-complete.
If j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then let υ be the facet of τ opposite xj
′
. Using Lemma 6.3 the choice
of j′ implies that A−1
B∗,υ
is semi-lexicopositive and hence υ is B∗-complete.
Again, Lemma 6.3 guarantees that replacement of another column of AB∗,τ would give
a new matrix that does not have a semi-lexicopositive inverse. This implies that the two
cases considered above are mutually exclusive, and that the facet υ and the set B̂∗ are
uniquely determined. Q.E.D.
The operation used in the proof of Lemma 6.5, where a column of AB∗,τ is determined
in a unique way and is replaced by the vector (0, eM(
∑i−1
i=1 Mi + k)
>)> is called a semi-
lexicographic pivot step in Step 4 of Algorithm 4.2. Case 1 of Lemma 6.5 happens if one
goes from Step 4 of Algorithm 4.2 to Step 3, and Case 2 if one goes from Step 4 to Step 2.
It has already been indicated that Algorithm 4.2 generates a sequence of adjacent complete
facets with varying dimension. The idea of adjacent is made precise in Definition 6.6.
Definition 6.6 (Adjacent complete facets) Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. The complete facets
τ and τ̂ are adjacent if τ and τ̂ are both B∗-complete facets of the same simplex of Σ(B∗),
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or if τ is a B∗-complete facet of the B̂∗-complete simplex τ̂ of Σ(B∗), or if τ̂ is a B̂∗-complete
facet of the B∗-complete simplex τ of Σ(B̂∗).
Theorem 6.7 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ. If τ = {0} × S(B0∗)
or τ ⊂ {1} × S, then τ has one adjacent complete facet. Otherwise, τ has two adjacent
complete facets.
Proof
Let τ = {0}×S(B0∗). Since {0}×S(B
0
∗) is a subset of the relative boundary of [0, 1]×S(B
0
∗),
there is a unique 1-simplex σ ∈ Σ(B0∗) such that τ is a facet of σ. By Lemma 6.4 it holds
that either σ has exactly one other B0∗ -complete facet τ , or the 1-simplex σ is B∗-complete
for precisely one admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗. So there exists exactly one adjacent complete facet
to {0} × S(B0∗).
Let τ ⊂ {1} × S be B∗-complete. Clearly, there is no admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗ such that
τ ∈ Σ(B∗), since a simplex in Σ(B∗) has always vertices outside {1}×S. Since τ is a subset
of the relative boundary of [0, 1] × S, there is a unique 1-simplex σ ∈ Σ(B∗) such that τ
is a facet of σ. It follows again by Lemma 6.4 that there is exactly one adjacent complete
facet to τ.
For all other adjacent complete facets τ it holds either that τ belongs to the relative
boundary of [0, 1]× S or to the relative interior of [0, 1]× S.
In the first case there is a unique σ ∈ Σ(B∗) having τ as a facet. By Lemma 6.4
it holds that either σ has exactly one other B∗-complete facet τ , or σ is B∗-complete for
precisely one admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗. This gives us one adjacent complete facet to τ. Moreover,
τ ∈ Σ(B∗) for precisely one admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗, since τ lies in the relative boundary of
Σ(B∗), τ 6= {0} × S(B0∗) by assumption, and τ is not a subset of {1} × S by assumption,
and τ /∈ {0} × S by Lemma 6.2. By Lemma 6.5 it holds that either τ is B̂∗-complete for
precisely one admissible B̂∗ ⊂ Φ∗ with B̂∗ 6= B∗, or precisely one facet υ of τ is B∗-complete.
In the latter case we are done. In the first case, since τ belongs to the relative boundary of
Σ(B̂∗), there is exactly one σ̂ ∈ Σ(B̂∗) having τ as a facet, and applying Lemma 6.4 again
gives the second adjacent complete facet to τ. There can be no other adjacent complete
facets to τ.
When τ belongs to the relative interior of Σ(B∗), we apply Lemma 6.4 twice to get
exactly two adjacent complete facets. Q.E.D.
The implications of Theorem 6.7 are striking. The B0∗-complete facet {0} × S(B
0
∗) has
exactly one adjacent complete facet. That facet either belongs to the boundary of {1}×S
and we have found an approximate Nash equilibrium1, or has exactly one adjacent com-
1It will usually not be the case that the boundary {1} × S is reached in one step. For this to occur it
is required that the triangulation Σ has a very large mesh size.
22
plete facet not being equal to {0} × S(B0∗). In this way a sequence of adjacent complete
facets is generated in a unique way, starting from {0} × S(B0∗). The systematic steps of
how to generate this sequence are given in Algorithm 4.2. Theorem 6.8 shows that the
algorithm always reaches in a finite number of steps a complete facet in {1}×S. As stated
in Theorem 6.9, this implies that the algorithm converges to an ε-Nash equilibrium in a
finite number of steps.
Theorem 6.8 (Convergence of Algorithm 4.2) Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given. Then there
exists a unique finite sequence of complete facets τ 1, . . . , τ n̂ such that τ 1 = {0} × S(B0∗),
τ k̂ ⊂ {1} × S, and any two successive facets in the finite sequence are adjacent complete
facets.
Proof
Let τ 1 = {0} × S(B0∗). Let τ
2 be the unique adjacent complete facet that exists according
to Theorem 6.7. Whenever τ k for some k > 1 is not equal to {0}×S(B0∗) and not a subset
of {1} × S, there exists by Theorem 6.7 a unique adjacent complete facet τ k+1 not equal
to τ k−1. Now it follows from the door-in door-out principle of Lemke and Howson (1964)
that all simplices generated in the sequence above are different. Moreover, the collection
of all facets of simplices in Σ(B∗) is finite for any admissible B∗ ⊂ Φ∗. So, after a finite
number of steps, say k̂, a facet in {1} × S must be reached. Q.E.D.
By connecting the solutions found in each of the complete facets generated by the algo-
rithm, we find the path generated by the algorithm, π : [0, 1] → [0, 1] × S, as constructed
in Section 4.
Theorem 6.9 Let (Γ, p,Σ) be given with mesh(Σ) ≤ δ, where δ satisfies ‖x̂ − x̃‖∞ ≤ δ
implies ‖G(x̂) − G(x̃)‖∞ ≤
1
2
ε, x̂, x̃ ∈ [0, 1] × S. Then π(r) = (t, s) implies that s is an
ε-Nash equilibrium of Γt. Moreover, π(0) = (0, s) with siki = 1 for all (i, ki) ∈ B
0
∗ , and
π(1) = (1, s∗) with s∗ an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof
This follows straightforwardly from Theorem 3.2, Theorem 6.8, and the definition of Algo-
rithm 4.2. Q.E.D.
Theorem 6.9 shows that any (t, s) in the image set of π corresponds to an ε-Nash equilibri-
um of Γt. Since we have shown that the algorithm reaches a complete facet in {1}×S in a
finite number of steps, we know that the algorithm converges to an ε-Nash equilibrium in a
finite number of steps. Notice that this result is true for any game and any prior, irrespec-
tive of possible degeneracies. It is clear that the inaccuracy of the final solution generated,
ε, depends on the mesh size of the triangulation. If the mesh size of the triangulation goes
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to zero, then also the inaccuracy ε goes to zero. From a practical perspective, there is a
clear trade-off between rapid convergence and getting very accurate solutions.
7 Convergence to the Linear Tracing Procedure
It has been shown that Algorithm 4.2 converges to some ε-Nash equilibrium, given any game
and prior. It remains to be shown that this ε-Nash equilibrium is indeed an approximation
of the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure. To verify this, we need a
distance function to measure the discrepancy between the set Lc generated by the linear
tracing procedure, and points π(r) which are generated by Algorithm 4.2.
Let S denote the collection of all non-empty compact subsets of [0, 1] × S. We define
the distance function d : [0, 1]× S × S → IR by
d(x, T ) = min
y∈T
‖x− y‖∞, x ∈ [0, 1]× S, T ∈ S.
Theorem 7.1 Let (Γ, p) be given. Then, for every ε > 0, there exists δ > 0, such that for
every triangulation Σ of [0, 1]×S satisfying mesh(Σ) < δ it holds that maxr∈[0,1] d(π(r),Lc) ≤
ε.
Proof
Suppose the theorem is not true. Then there exists ε > 0 such that for every n ∈ IN there
exists a triangulation Σn of [0, 1]× S such that mesh(Σn) < 1
n
, and there exists rn ∈ [0, 1]
such that d(πn(rn),Lc) > ε. Here πn : [0, 1] → [0, 1] × S denotes the path generated by
the algorithm when the triangulation Σn is used. By Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 1,
page 16, the sequence {πn([0, 1])}n∈IN has a convergent subsequence. By Theorem 3.2 and
by continuity of the function G, it follows that the closed limit of a converging subsequence
of {πn([0, 1])}n∈IN belongs to L. Moreover, since πn([0, 1]) is connected for every n ∈ IN, the
closed limit is connected by Mas-Colell (1985), Theorem A.5.1(ii), page 10. But then the
closed limit should be a subset of Lc since it contains points in L0. Take any accumulation
point x of the sequence {πn(rn)}n∈IN. Then
0 = d(x,Lc) ≥ inf{d(πn(rn),Lc) | n ∈ IN} ≥ ε,
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.1 shows that for all games the algorithm stays arbitrarily close to the strategies
defined by the linear tracing procedure. This even holds true if the linear tracing proce-
dure is not well defined and does not select a unique Nash equilibrium. In that case the
ε-Nash equilibrium generated by the algorithm is still an approximation of one of the Nash
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equilibria in Lc. Theorem 7.1 does not only claim that π(1) is close to a Nash equilibrium
selected by the linear tracing procedure. It makes clear that the entire path π does not get
further than ε away from Lc.
Theorem 7.2 Let (Γ, p) be given. If the linear tracing procedure is well defined, then, for
every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for every triangulation Σ of [0, 1] × S satisfying
mesh(Σ) < δ it holds that max(t,s)∈Lc d((t, s), π([0, 1])) ≤ ε. Moreover, if (0, s0) ∈ Lc, then
d((0, s0), {π(0)}) ≤ ε, and if (1, s∗) ∈ Lc, then d((1, s∗), {π(1)}) ≤ ε.
Proof
Suppose the theorem is not true. Then there exists ε > 0 such that for every n ∈ IN
there is a triangulation Σn of [0, 1] × S with mesh(Σn) < 1
n
, and there is (tn, sn) ∈ Lc
such that d((tn, sn), πn([0, 1])) > ε. Without loss of generality the sequence {(tn, sn)}n∈IN
is convergent, say to (t, s), and by Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 1, page 16, the se-
quence {(πn([0, 1]))}n∈IN is convergent, say to the set Π. By Theorem 7.1 it follows that
Π ⊂ Lc. Obviously, (t, s) /∈ Π. Since the set L0 is a polytope, well definedness of the
linear tracing procedure implies that L0 contains a single point, say (0, s0). Similarly, well
definedness yields that there is only one (t, s) ∈ Lc such that t = 1, say (1, s1). It follows
that πn(0)→ (0, s0) and πn(1)→ (1, s1). The results of Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991)
imply that Lc is path-connected. Then it is easily seen that the linear tracing procedure is
well defined if and only if there is a homeomorphism h : [0, 1]→ Lc with h(0) = (0, s0) and
h(1) = (1, s1). Moreover, there is r ∈ (0, 1) such that (t, s) = h(r). By Mas-Colell (1985),
Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10, Π is connected. However, Π ⊂ h([0, 1] \ {r}), h(0) ∈ Π,
h(1) ∈ Π, and h is a homeomorphism, so Π is not connected, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.2 claims that the path generated by the algorithm approximates every strategy
of the linear tracing procedure if the linear tracing procedure is well defined. Obviously, if
for instance the set Lc has a branch point, then it cannot be expected that all points in Lc
are approximated by the path π generated by Algorithm 4.2. In this case the algorithm
will track one of the branches that leads to an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 7.3 Let (Γ, p) be given. Let (Σn)n∈IN be a sequence of triangulations of [0, 1]×S
with mesh size converging to zero. If the linear tracing procedure is well defined, then
πn([0, 1]) converges to Lc in the Hausdorff topology on S.
If the linear tracing procedure is well defined, then every strategy generated by it is approx-
imated by Algorithm 4.2, see Theorem 7.2, and every strategy generated by Algorithm 4.2
approximates a strategy corresponding to the linear tracing procedure according to The-
orem 7.1. Since the linear tracing procedure is well defined for almost every game, see
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Harsanyi (1975), this implies that the algorithm converges to the linear tracing procedure
in the Hausdorff sense for almost all games.
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